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ABSTRACT 
 
Dynamic Operational Risk Assessment with Bayesian Network. (August 2012) 
Shubharthi Barua, B.Sc., Bangladesh University of Engineering & Technology 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. M. Sam Mannan 
 
Oil/gas and petrochemical plants are complicated and dynamic in nature. 
Dynamic characteristics include ageing of equipment/components, season changes, 
stochastic processes, operator response times, inspection and testing time intervals, 
sequential dependencies of equipment/components and timing of safety system 
operations, all of which are time dependent criteria that can influence dynamic 
processes. The conventional risk assessment methodologies can quantify dynamic 
changes in processes with limited capacity. Therefore, it is important to develop method 
that can address time-dependent effects. The primary objective of this study is to 
propose a risk assessment methodology for dynamic systems. In this study, a new 
technique for dynamic operational risk assessment is developed based on the Bayesian 
networks, a structure optimal suitable to organize cause-effect relations. The Bayesian 
network graphically describes the dependencies of variables and the dynamic Bayesian 
network capture change of variables over time. This study proposes to develop dynamic 
fault tree for a chemical process system/sub-system and then to map it in Bayesian 
network so that the developed method can capture dynamic operational changes in 
  
iv 
iv 
process due to sequential dependency of one equipment/component on others. The 
developed Bayesian network is then extended to the dynamic Bayesian network to 
demonstrate dynamic operational risk assessment. A case study on a holdup tank 
problem is provided to illustrate the application of the method. A dryout scenario in the 
tank is quantified. It has been observed that the developed method is able to provide 
updated probability different equipment/component failure with time incorporating the 
sequential dependencies of event occurrence. Another objective of this study is to show 
parallelism of Bayesian network with other available risk assessment methods such as 
event tree, HAZOP, FMEA.  In this research, an event tree mapping procedure in 
Bayesian network is described. A case study on a chemical reactor system is provided to 
illustrate the mapping procedure and to identify factors that have significant influence on 
an event occurrence. Therefore, this study provides a method for dynamic operational 
risk assessment capable of providing updated probability of event occurrences 
considering sequential dependencies with time and a model for mapping event tree in 
Bayesian network.      
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
 The offshore oil/gas, chemical, petrochemical, food, power, papermaking and 
other process industries consist of numerous equipment and unit operations, thousands 
of control loops, and exhibit dynamic behavior. These process facilities have to deal with 
different hazards and several types of risks. At the same time, they have to meet the 
demand for higher quality of products by following rigorous environmental and safety 
regulations. Failure to manage or minimize hazards can result into serious incidents. For 
example, process facilities involve a large number of pumps, compressors, separators, 
complex piping system and storage tanks, etc. in congested area. A small mistake by an 
operator or a problem in the process system may escalate into a disastrous event as the 
process area is congested with process equipment and piping systems, and has limited 
ventilation and escape routes.  Process plants are subjected to different types of risks in 
daily operations, which include process risks, risks due to reactivity, toxicity and 
mechanical hazards, fire and explosion risks. Therefore, it is very important to identify 
hazards, perform risk assessments, and take proper initiatives to minimize/remove 
hazards and risks; else a catastrophic accident may result.   
 
 
 
This thesis follows the style of Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. 
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From case histories, it has been observed that catastrophic accidents have a 
significant effect on people, environment, and society. Catastrophic accidents such as the 
Flixborough disaster, the Bhopal incident, and the Piper Alpha disaster caused fatalities 
and unbearable economic loss. The U.S. Chemical Safety Board (U.S. CSB, April 06, 
2012) completed investigation on sixty-five serious accidents that occurred in the U.S.A. 
since 1998. Investigations of catastrophic accidents have reported insufficient process 
safety, inadequate management of change and lack of risk reductions measures as root 
causes of these accidents. For example, a vapor cloud explosion taking place at BP 
Texas City refinery in 2005 resulted in 15 fatalities, 180 injuries and $1.5 billion in 
losses (U.S. CSB, 2007). The investigation revealed that insufficient process safety and 
lack of risk reduction measures contributed to this catastrophic accident. The U.S. CSB 
investigation on natural gas explosion at ConAgra foods processing facility North 
Carolina in 2009, and Kleen Energy power plant Connecticut in 2010, reported failure to 
adopt inherently safer method from fire and explosion hazard perspective led to 
explosions (Khakzad et al., 2011). In 2010, a fire and explosion, resulting from a 
blowout, at the Macondo well resulted in 11 deaths and 17 injuries (U.S. National 
Commission on BP accident, 2011). Also the continuous spill from the wellhead for 87 
days had disastrous effects on the environment and wildlife surrounding the Gulf of 
Mexico.  
Presently, The U.S. CSB has been conducting investigations on fourteen other 
major accidents in The U.S.A. Disastrous accidents in refineries, power plants and 
offshore platforms involved fatalities and great financial loss. The accidents have 
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significantly affected people’s perception, and contributed greatly to raise concern to 
emphasize process safety. It is explicit that effective risk assessment and adequate 
process safety management can prevent or reduce severity of accidents. Therefore, 
continuous attention should be provided to improve available risk assessment 
methodologies. Also, it is important to develop new risk assessment technique that can 
provide more information and flexibility to the industry for better risk management than 
the available techniques. The objective of this research is to propose a technique for 
dynamic operational risk assessment. The following sections in this chapter demonstrate 
the problem statement, objectives and contributions of this research.  
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
The oil/gas, chemical and petrochemical process industries are complicated and 
dynamic in nature. Dynamic characteristics involve various time-dependent effects such 
as changes in seasons, aging of process equipment/component, stochastic processes, 
human error, inspection and testing time intervals, hardware failures, process 
disturbances, sequential dependencies and timing of safety system operations. It is 
important to quantify risks arising from above stated time-dependent effects. But, 
conventional risk assessment methodologies have limited ability to quantify dynamic 
changes in processes. For example, fault tree or event tree describes the relationship 
between the final outcome and different component/equipment failure but failed to 
incorporate system dynamic response to time, variations of process variables, operator 
actions, sequential dependencies etc. Catastrophic accidents may result when critical 
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process parameters exceed the safe operating region without being detected (Yang,2010; 
Yang and Mannan, 2010) due to protective system failure or timing of safety system 
operations. Yang (2010) described BP Texas City refinery accident as an example of 
operational failure in process industry. Therefore, it can be stated that available 
methodologies are not able to provide accurate results because of their inadequate ability 
to describe the variation of operational risk as time-dependent deviations, or the changes 
occurring in the process. Hence, it is important to develop a method that has the ability 
to quantify risk arising due to different time-dependent effects.  
 
1.3 Research Objective 
The purpose of this study is to develop a dynamic operational risk assessment 
method that can provide updated risk with time, model sequential dependencies, 
demonstrate the effect of inspection and testing time intervals and incorporate other time 
dependent effects. Bayesian network is used to develop the new dynamic operational 
risk assessment method. The objectives of this research are to:  
 Develop a dynamic risk assessment methodology based on Bayesian network , 
which is a universally applicable probabilistic cause-effect model structure 
 Demonstrate parallelism of Bayesian network based risk assessment 
methodologies with other available methodologies  
 Describe advantages of Bayesian network based risk assessment methodology’s 
application in chemical process safety over other methods 
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GeNIe (Decision Systems Laboratory, 2010), an open source software developed 
by Decision System Laboratory, University of Pittsburgh, is used to fulfill the objectives.  
 
1.4 Research Contributions  
Conventional risk assessment methodologies are static in nature. They also have 
limited ability to quantify different time dependent effects such as, inspection and testing 
time interval, operator response times and equipment/component ageing. This research 
demonstrates the application of Bayesian network to develop a methodology that has the 
ability to provide continuous update of risk with time. Furthermore, developed approach 
allows us to incorporate changes in the failure probability of equipment based on 
inspection and testing time interval. Bayesian network has widespread application in the 
field of artificial intelligence, medical diagnostics, financial sector, etc. The application 
of Bayesian network in the field of chemical process safety, risk analysis and accident 
modeling is relatively new. Current available studies are only as follows: 
 Khakzad et al. (2011) described mapping of fault tree of process industry in 
Bayesian network based on the method provided by Bobbio et al. (2011) 
 Pasman and Rogers (2011) described incorporation of Bayesian network in Layer 
of Protection Analysis (LOPA) 
 Khakzad et al. (2012) further provided methodology for mapping bow-tie 
analysis in Bayesian network and demonstrate probability adapting 
However, the first two studies are static in nature. The authors in the last one 
described the method as dynamic risk assessment. This method can update probability in 
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presence of new information. But, this study did not consider the sequential dependency 
and the effect of time in the model. This research provides a methodology based on 
Bayesian network that has the ability to show the effect of time and provides updated 
probability with time in presence of new information. Therefore, this research will 
provide a new tool for dynamic operational risk assessment that can be useful for oil/gas, 
chemical, petrochemical and other industries for quantitative risk analysis.   
 
1.4.1 Relationship with previous research at MKOPSC 
In figure 1, researches since 2007 done on dynamic operational risk assessment 
and Bayesian statistics at Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center (MKOPSC) are 
described.  
In 2007, Gen Woong Yun developed the Bayesian-LOPA methodology for 
performing risk assessment of a LNG importation terminal (Yun et al., 2009). This 
methodology employs Bayesian statistics to update general data obtained from databases 
with plant specific data. Generic data for equipment and component are obtained from 
several databases. LNG plant specific data are used for likelihood estimation and then 
combined with generic data to get posterior data.  
In 2010, Xiaole Yang developed a dynamic operational risk assessment (DORA) 
methodology that follows semi-markovian approaches (Yang, 2010; Yang and Mannan, 
2010). DORA methodology is mainly a stochastic simulation with the ability to quantify 
events. Component inspection and testing time interval is incorporated in the DORA 
method as a critical parameter. System state trajectory simulation is performed based on 
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Monte-Carlo method. The research also demonstrates application of Bayesian statistics 
for uncertainty reduction.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Researches on dynamic operational risk assessment and Bayesian statistics in 
MKOPSC 
 
 
In this research, a new method for dynamic operational risk assessment method is  
demonstrated through applying the Bayesian network, an important subset of the 
Bayesian statistics. The methodology describes how conventional technique such as 
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methodology 
Bayesian 
statistics used 
to update 
generic data 
with plant 
specific data 
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Fault tree, Event tree can be improved by mapping in the Bayesian network and 
demonstrates the dynamic Bayesian network’s ability to capture change in the values of 
different variables with time. The Bayesian statistics in previous researches are used to 
reduce uncertainty. In this study, by applying the Bayesian network, causal relationship 
between causes and effects are described by assigning conditional probability, and then 
the Bayesian statistics is used for probability estimation. Also, in previous studies, the 
Bayesian statistics is applied only for probability distribution, not for discrete values. 
This study has developed discrete time Bayesian network based dynamic operational risk 
assessment, and demonstrated the application of probability distribution for developing 
continuous-time Bayesian network based risk assessment method for future work.  
 
1.5 Organization of This Thesis 
Section 1 is an introductory chapter that provides background information, 
research scope and objectives. In Section 2, brief introduction on conventional risk 
assessment methodologies, previous researches on developing dynamic risk assessment 
techniques and Bayesian network’s application for reliability and risk analysis are 
discussed. The research methodology is presented in the following Section 3. In this 
chapter, overall research framework is explained. In Section 4, a case study is 
demonstrated to illustrate the application of developed method. In that chapter, an 
application of the developed method is provided to demonstrate the advantages of 
Bayesian network over other methods. In Section 5, an event tree generalization 
technique using Bayesian network is provided to illustrate parallelism with other 
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quantitative risk assessment techniques with Bayesian network. Section 6 provides 
overall summary and recommendations for future research.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 General Background 
The oil/gas, chemical, petrochemical and other process industries use equipment 
such as reactors, heat exchangers, distillation columns, storage vessels, pumps, 
compressors and complicated piping system. High level of heat and mass integration has 
made chemical process plant operation very complex and any small error can result 
catastrophic consequences. It is important to identify the hazards in the process and to 
know the risks posed by these hazards. Risk is a function of probability of any event 
occurrence and its consequence severity. Risk can be expressed as the measure of 
potential loss of property, human life, economic loss and other possible effects (Yang, 
2010; Yang and Mannan, 2010). The risk assessment process identifies possible risks, 
characterizes their nature and magnitude, evaluates their occurrence probability, 
analyzes contributing factors, and assesses risk reduction measures. Risk analysis 
consists of risk assessment, risk management and risk communication (Yang, 2010; 
Yang and Mannan, 2010). The objective of performing risk assessment is to identify 
what can go wrong, how it can go wrong and its likelihood. Several qualitative and 
quantitative methods are available to perform risk analysis. The risk analysis method to 
be performed for a process is chosen depending on the scope of study required. This 
chapter provides brief introduction of the available risk analysis methodologies and 
demonstrates their limited ability of addressing different time-dependent effects of 
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dynamic process. Then a concise description of dynamic risk assessment methodologies, 
their strength and weakness are provided.    
  
2.2 Conventional Risk Assessment Methodologies 
A checklist is a methodical approach that lists all possible hazards or problems 
that may exist in a process industry. It is one of the simplest hazard identification 
methods (Khan and Abbasi, 1998). A checklist questions are mainly based on the 
operation and maintenance of a process plant, previous incident history, review of 
different documents, inspection and interview of plant personnel or based on standards 
and codes. A checklist development is dependent on the experiences of the personnel 
and it is very likely that some important aspects can be overlooked in a checklist. A 
checklist focuses on a single item at a time and has limited ability to detect hazards due 
to different operating condition in different equipment or unit operations. For these 
limitations, checklist application is limited.  
What-if analysis is a systematic method that ask question starting with “what-
if…” to identify potential irregularity in the process. It provides qualitative descriptions 
of any activity or system problem those results from human errors, abnormal process 
conditions equipment failures, etc. What-if analysis is especially useful for relatively 
simple failure scenarios.  
A safety audit or review is done to detect safety problems in working zone i.e., 
process areas, laboratories etc. A safety review is conducted for new process or during 
modification of existing processes to identify any lacks in operating procedure or to 
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detect equipment conditions that may lead to an incident. The safety audit/review report 
provides insight into plant conditions from safety point of view and recommendations 
for improvements.  
 Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) is the most commonly used hazard 
identification methods. A multi-disciplinary team of experienced personnel from 
operations, maintenance and design review process flow diagrams, piping and 
instrumentation diagrams, process descriptions, operating procedures to identify possible 
consequences due to deviations from normal conditions and causes of deviations. 
HAZOP is based on different guidewords and provides primary ideas about hazards 
associated in a process with recommendations for minimizing or removing them. Like 
other qualitative methods, the quality of HAZOP is dependent on the experience of the 
people conducting it. The HAZOP procedure is briefly provided by Yang (2010). Khan 
and Abbasi (1998) described two main limitations of HAZOP, i.e., limited ability to 
incorporate spatial features with plant layout and requirement of long time to perform 
study. 
The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) was the first to make quantitative 
risk assessment mandatory for ‘Concept Safety Evaluation’ in their guideline published 
in 1981 (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 1981). But, it has received wide-spread 
acceptance in the oil and gas industry after the Piper Alpha disaster in 1988. The Lord 
Cullen investigation report (1990) on the Piper Alpha disaster recommended formulating 
quantitative risk assessment as an official requirement for the oil and gas industry. The 
U.K. Safety Case Regulation 1992 (UK HSE, 1992) made quantitative risk analysis 
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(QRA) mandatory for all existing and new installation in North Sea region. Since then, 
operators in the North Sea have to perform QRA studies to demonstrate that the potential 
risk is below the acceptable risk criteria and that actions have been taken to minimize the 
risk to ‘as low as reasonably practicable’. Vinnem (1998) summarized the application of 
quantitative risk assessment for offshore installations. Several quantitative risk 
assessment methods are described in this section briefly.  
In 1961, Bell Telephone Laboratories developed the fault tree analysis (Khan and 
Abbasi, 1998). In 1975, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission introduced the fault 
tree for nuclear industry (The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1975). Later, the 
fault tree’s application has become extensive in reliability studies in the aerospace and 
chemical process industries. It is a graphical deductive process that starts reasoning from 
the top event to the undesirable events. In the conventional fault tree, there are two static 
gates, i.e. AND-gate, and OR-gate, that connect basic events failure with intermediate 
events and top event. In this approach, to understand failure mechanism explicitly, focus 
can be given to particular system failure at a time. But, the fault tree has some 
disadvantages as it can address common cause failures with limited ability (Khan and 
Abbasi, 1998). Fault tree has weakness in quantifying risks due to dynamically changing 
behavior or environment (Siu, 1994; Khan and Abbasi, 1998). Also, the conventional 
fault tree cannot adequately capture the sequential dependencies of 
equipment/components failure. Khan and Abbasi (1998) listed several studies that 
proposed improvement in conventional fault tree. Recently, Magott and Skrobanek 
(2012) proposed a fault tree based method which is capable of analyzing time-
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dependencies. An event tree is an inductive process that demonstrates the sequences of 
different safeguards and human response failure due to an initiating event that lead to 
undesired consequences. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1975) introduced 
the method for nuclear industry and its application in chemical process industry is 
described by AIChE (2000), Mannan (2005), Delvosalle et al. (2006). Event tree’s 
application is advantageous to determine possible consequences probability due to 
different initiating event and subsequent safety barriers and protection failure.  
The bow-tie method is a combination of an event tree and fault tree. It is a 
graphical representation of complete accident scenario in which fault tree provides 
different causes towards a critical event and the event tree describes possible 
consequences due to the critical event. Delvosalle et al. (2006) demonstrated Bow-tie 
method’s application for accident scenario identification in process industries. Mokhtari 
et al. (2011) proposed bow-tie based risk analysis method for sea ports and offshore 
terminals. Markowski and Kotynia (2011) demonstrated application of bow-tie model in 
layer of protection analysis (LOPA).       
Layer of protection analysis (LOPA) is a semi-quantitative method that provides 
qualitative results of consequence with failure frequency data. It is derived from safety 
philosophy in the nuclear industry and became introduced to the process industry in the 
late nineties. The objective of performing layer of protection analysis is to determine 
sufficient independent safeguards that are available to prevent incidents. It should be 
noted all safeguards are not always independent layers of protection. Center for 
Chemical Process Safety (2001) described criteria for safeguards to be considered as 
15 
 
 
 
independent layer. Details of LOPA procedure are available at Center for Chemical 
Process Safety (2001), Markowshi A.S. (2006). Yun, G.W. (2007) incorporated 
Bayesian statistics to propose Bayesian-LOPA methodology for risk assessment.   
 
2.3 Dynamic Risk Assessment Methods 
Conventional risk assessment methods are static in nature. The oil/gas, chemical, 
petrochemical and other process industries are dynamic in nature. The process condition 
is dependent on variation of certain process variables which is affected by several time-
dependent effects such as season changes, ageing of equipment/components, sequential 
dependencies, operator experiences and operation time, inspection and testing time 
interval etc. But, the conventional risk assessment methodologies have limited ability to 
quantify these time dependent effects. Siu (1994) summarized different methods 
developed for performing dynamic process systems risk assessment.  
The Markov modeling is one of the widely accepted methods for dynamic risk 
analysis. State transition diagram is constructed to represent possible system states and 
transition from one state to another. A transition matrix is developed to characterize the 
Markov process. One of the limitations of the Markov process is that with increase of the 
system size, number of states also increases. It makes construction of system state 
transition diagram and computation complex (Reliability Analysis Center, 2003). Also, 
the Markov theory based models do not consider the effect of inspection on system-state 
transitions. The Markov model does not define the effect of inspection/testing time 
schedule.  
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Dynamic Logical Analytical Methodology (DYLAM) approach was proposed by 
Cacciabue et al. (1986). Nivolianitou et al. (1986) demonstrated application of DYLAM 
approach in reliability analysis of chemical processes. This method has the ability to 
quantify different time dependent effects by incorporating dynamic aspects of a process. 
It integrates physical behavior of the system and probabilistic modeling for analysis. In 
DYLAM, physical model for the system and component models for system components 
are constructed to predict system process variables reactions due to variations in 
component states. After defining undesired system states, the system model is simulated 
for all possible accident sequences to detect all possible combinations of status and states 
and calculate their likelihood. The DYLAM has limited ability to treat large number of 
scenarios and scenario calculations can be lengthier and more costly (Siu, 1994).  
In the dynamic event tree, branching is allowed to take place at different points in 
time. Analyst defines the basis and required number of branches at any time step. Acosta 
and Siu (1993) described its application for accident sequence analysis.   
Yang and Mannan (2010) proposed a semi-markovian approach named dynamic 
operational risk assessment (DORA) methodology. The DORA addresses dynamic 
effects in process industry by integrating process dynamic and system stochastic 
behavior. It can quantify risks for both component failure and component’s abnormal 
events. The DORA method incorporated inspection/testing time schedule to understand 
its effect on risk. Monte Carlo simulation is performed to understand system abnormal 
condition due to each individual component’s transition from one state to another and 
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then prolonged simulation is performed to understand effect of inspection and testing 
time on the probability of component abnormal event.  
 
2.4 Overview of Bayesian Network Applications 
Bayesian network is a probabilistic reasoning technique that can be very useful to 
represent complex dependencies between random variables. Weber et al. (2012) 
provides a summary of Bayesian network’s application in the field of dependability, risk 
analysis and maintenance. Application of Bayesian network for process safety, accident 
analysis and risk assessment is relatively new. As described in section 1.4, Khakzad et 
al. (2011) described Bayesian network application in accident analysis in the field of 
process safety based on the work by Bobbio et al. (2001) that demonstrated application 
of Bayesian network in improvement of dependable system. In the field of 
dependability, Boudali and Dugan (2005) demonstrated sequential dependencies of 
events and Montani et al. (2005) included temporal aspects for analyzing reliability 
analysis. Pasman and Rogers (2011) incorporated Bayesian network in layer of 
protection analysis. Hudson et al. (2002) described Bayesian network application on 
anti-terrorism risk management planning. Summary of similar studies in risk analysis is 
provided by Weber et al. (2012). Khakzad et al. (2012) mapped bow-tie method into 
Bayesian network. Any study in process safety and risk analysis is yet to conduct on 
temporal aspects. Using the temporal reasoning, dynamic risk assessment methodology 
can be provided by incorporating effects of time. This study uses temporal reasoning for 
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proposing a dynamic operational risk assessment methodology that can easily quantify 
operational changes due to sequential dependencies of equipment/components.   
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3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF BAYESIAN NETWORK BASED DYNAMIC 
OPERATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 
 
In this section mapping procedure of conventional fault tree and dynamic fault 
tree in Bayesian network and then development dynamic operational risk assessment 
methodology based on Bayesian network is illustrated. This section demonstrates how to 
set up conditional probability tables for different dependent variables and Bayesian 
network ability to update prior probability with new information into posterior 
probability. This chapter provides brief introduction of fault tree, dynamic fault tree, 
Bayesian network and its characteristics and dynamic Bayesian network framework in 
section 3.1 and demonstrates the research framework with details of the mapping 
procedure in section 3.2.  
 
3.1 Introduction 
Bayesian network based dynamic operational risk assessment methodology, is a 
new technique developed in this research. This study demonstrates an advancement of 
application of Bayesian network in process safety. The methodology may provide more 
reliable description of different equipment or component failure probability with time for 
any oil/gas, chemical, petrochemical and other process industries. This method is very 
much helpful for those fields where availability of operational history is limited. In this 
section, brief description of fault tree, dynamic fault tree with characteristics and 
description of Bayesian network and dynamic Bayesian network is provided.  
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3.1.1 Dynamic fault tree 
Conventional fault tree has limited ability to capture sequence dependencies in 
the system. If a system consists of a primary (active) pump and a back-up (standby) 
pump, then in case of primary pump failure, the back-up pump can become active and 
continues the system operation. But, if the back-up pump fails before the active pump 
fails, then the back-up pump fails to become active to substitute primary pump and the 
system is in failed state when the primary pump fails. Therefore, the failure criteria of 
the overall system are dependent on both the sequence and combinations of events. 
Dugan et al. (1990) defined different sequence dependencies and Dugan et al. (1992) 
introduced dynamic fault tree for fault tolerant computer systems. Dynamic fault tree 
goes over conventional fault tree by defining following dynamic gates which capture the 
component’s sequential and functional dependencies - 
 The functional/probabilistic dependency gate (FDEP)/(PDEP) 
 The spare gates (Warm-WSP, Hot-HSP, Cold-CSP) 
 The priority AND gate (PAND) 
 The sequence enforcing gate (SEQ) 
This research work demonstrates development of dynamic fault tree using 
different dynamic gates introduced by Dugan et al. (1990, 1992). Brief descriptions of 
these gates are provided in this work.  
 
3.1.1.1 The functional/probabilistic dependency gate (FDEP/PDEP) 
In the functional dependency gate/probabilistic dependency gate, there is a 
trigger event on which some other events are dependent. The dependent events become 
21 
 
 
 
inaccessible in case of the trigger event occurrence. Figure 2 represents a 
function/probabilistic dependency gate. A trigger event can either be a basic event or 
output of another gate and its occurrence can cause two dependent events X and Y,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Functional/probabilistic dependency gate 
 
 
inaccessible or unusable. Non-dependent output of the gate represents trigger event’s 
status.  
 
3.1.1.2 The spare gates 
A spare gate generally consists of a primary component/equipment that can be 
replaced with one or more standby similar component/equipment to perform the same 
function in case of its failure. Whenever primary equipment/component fails, then the 
first standby equipment/component becomes active to continue the operation. If the first 
 
 
Trigger 
X Y 
FDEP/PDEP 
Status of the Trigger Event 
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standby fails, the next (if available) standby becomes active and so forth. A system with 
spare gate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Spare gates 
 
 
fails, if primary and all standby equipment fails. Also, a standby component can fail 
while it is not active, but its individual failure has no effect on the overall system until  
the primary and other standby equipment/component can perform the function.   
 Figure 3, shows a spare gate, where a primary input has two standby input S1 and 
S2. In case of primary input failure, at first S1 comes into operation and system continues 
to function. If S1 fails, then S2 comes into operation and if S2 fails, then the system fails. 
During Inactive state, the failure rate of the standby components/equipment is lower than 
that of in active state. Montani et al. (2005) defined dormancy factor, α, whose value can 
vary between 0 and 1, and stated that if the failure rate of a standby component is λ in 
Gate Output 
 
  
Primary S1 S2 
Spare Gate 
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active state, then its failure rate at inactive state is αλ. Spare gates are thus classified into 
three classes, i.e. Hot spare, Cold Spare and Warm Spare. If the standby component does 
not fail during inactive state, then it is called cold spare. But if the standby component 
fails during inactive state, then it is called hot spare. Different values of α, represents 
different spare gates. For, hot spare, α =1; for cold spare, α =0; and for warm spare, 
value of α is between 0 and 1. In figure 3, thus the standby input S1 and S2 may have 
dormancy factor, α with any value between 0 and 1, and their failure during inactive 
state is lower than that of active state. Also, failure of this standby equipment when 
primary input is active, does not have any effect on the overall system.   
 
3.1.1.3 The priority AND gate (PAND gate) 
The priority AND-gate (PAND gate) consists of an AND-gate and pre-assigned 
order of inputs failure. In figure 4, two events X and Y are in a PAND gate and it is 
assigned that for the gate failure X has to fail before Y. Therefore, the output of the 
PAND gate in figure 4 is in failed state if both X and Y fails and X fails before Y. If Y 
fails before X, then PAND-gate output remains in normal state.  
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Figure 4. Probability AND-Gate (PAND gate) 
 
 
3.1.1.4 The sequence enforcing gates (SEQ-gate) 
In sequence enforcing gates, the inputs are constrained to fail in a particular order 
to cause system failure or a critical event to occur. The sequence enforcing gate fails 
only if its input failure occurs from left to right order. This is the difference between 
PAND-gate and SEQ-gate. Also, SEQ gates can be represented as spare gates. The 
difference is that spare gates have one or multiple standby input that can perform the 
same function as the primary input. But, in SEQ gates, the inputs can be any input 
performing different function.  
 
 
3.1.2 Bayesian network  
Bayesian network is widely applied in Artificial Intelligence (Pearl, 1988;  
X Y 
Output 
25 
 
 
 
Neapolitan, 1990). Heckermann et al. (1995), Vomlel (2005) demonstrated some real life 
application of Bayesian network. Bobbio (2001) mapped fault trees into Bayesian 
network for dependability analysis and showed that Bayesian network has the ability to 
provide more precise reasoning with uncertainty. Recently, some authors applied 
Bayesian network in the field of process safety and accident modeling (Khakzad et al., 
2011; Pasman and Rogers, 2011; Khakzad et al. 2012). Khakzad et al. (2011) 
demonstrated parallelism between fault tree and Bayesian network and described several 
advantages of Bayesian network’s application in the field of accident modeling and 
process safety. Pasman and Rogers (2011) incorporated Bayesian network to improve 
Layer of Protection Analysis. Khakzad et al. (2012) mapped bow-tie analysis in 
Bayesian network. Bayesian network’s application in the field of process safety and risk 
analysis is still relatively new and therefore, there is a scope for Bayesian network 
application for different study in this field.      
A Bayesian network describes causal influence relations among variables via a 
directed acyclic graph. It represents a set of random variables in nodes and their 
conditional dependencies by drawing edges from one node to another. It has the ability 
to represent dependency among events clearly, accommodate multi- mode and 
continuous random variables, and incorporate information i.e. generic, system specific 
and expert judgment to support optimum decision making.  
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Figure 5. A simple Bayesian network 
 
 
A simple Bayesian network is shown in figure 5. In a binary network, nodes and 
arcs represents variables and causal relationships among different nodes. Conditional 
probability tables or defined probabilistic relationships among nodes represent how one 
variable is linked another one or multi-variables. The nodes that influence other 
variables and have unconditional probability are called parent or root nodes. Nodes that 
are conditionally dependent on their direct parents are called intermediate nodes. The top 
node is defined as a leaf node. 
Let         be a Bayesian network, where,         is a directed acyclic 
graph; V (random variables) represents nodes; and E represents edges between pairs of 
nodes of DAG. P represents probability distribution over V and                can 
be either discrete or continuous random variables (Donohue and Dugan, 2003). These 
random variables are assigned to the nodes and the edges. Bayesian networks can be  
represented by the joint probability distribution P(V);  
P(V) =                                        
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Here        = parent nodes of Xi. 
 A main advantage of the application of Bayesian networks in risk analysis is the 
ability to update prior data using Bayes’ theorem by incorporating new information. 
Also, Bayesian networks have an advantage of handling different types of uncertainty. 
Bayesian network can be a very useful tool for the fields where availability of data is 
limited and in case one wants to exploit the scarce information available best. 
 
3.1.3 Dynamic Bayesian network 
A general Bayesian network is static in nature, i.e., the joint probability 
distribution is usually a representation of a fixed point or an interval of time (McNaught 
and Zagorecki, 2010). A dynamic Bayesian network describes the evolution of joint 
probability distribution over time and thus extends general Bayesian network. Discrete 
time modeling to represent the progression of time in dynamic Bayesian network was 
proposed by Dean and Kanazawa (1989). In a dynamic Bayesian network, arcs links 
nodes from previous time slice to that of the next time slice to represent temporal 
dependencies among them.  
 Montani et al. (2005) provided detailed mapping procedure of dynamic fault tree 
into dynamic Bayesian network in dependability analysis. Kjaerulff (1995) demonstrated 
that Markov assumption can be held true for dynamic Bayesian network if the variable 
state at future time slice ‘(n+1)-th’ time slice is independent of past given the present ‘n-
th’ time slice. Boyen (1998) (Montani et al. 2005), Murphy (2002) described two-time 
slice Temporal Bayesian network.  
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 3.1.4 Software 
There are numbers of software available for developing and analyzing Bayesian 
network. Murphy (2007) provides a comparison among Bayesian network software. In 
this research, GeNIe 2.0, Bayesian network software developed by Decision Systems 
Laboratory (2010) is used for performing the analysis. This software is available free at 
http://genie.sis.pitt.edu/about.html and is compatible with other Bayesian network 
software. GeNIe supports both discrete and continuous variable though combination of 
both type of variables in a single network is still to be incorporated. GeNIe has temporal 
reasoning technique using which dynamic Bayesian network can be developed and 
analyzed. Other available software are: HUGIN (HUGIN EXPERT, 2012), BayesiaLab 
(BAYESIA SAS, 2010), Uninet (Lighttwist Software, 2008), BNT (Murphy,K., 2007) 
SAMIAM (AR Group-UCLA, 2010) etc.  
    
3.2 Research Framework 
Figure 6 shows overall framework to development dynamic operational risk 
assessment with Bayesian network. This method has the ability to automatically update 
probability if failure rate data is provided at the first time slice and conditional 
dependency is given.   
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 For developing dynamic operational risk assessment methodology based on 
Bayesian network, it is important to identify scope of work. It is also necessary to 
describe the system.  According to the requirement, the scope can vary from small scale 
to large scale of system. For system description, process information as process block 
diagram, process flow diagram (PFD), piping and instrumentation diagram (P&ID), 
equipment/components in the system and their failure modes should be stated.  
 
3.2.2 Identification of possible initiating event and component failure mode 
The next step is to identify possible initiating event that can lead to accident. To 
identify possible initiating event, it is required to perform any hazards identification 
method which can be used to develop scenarios. Yang (2010) summarized qualitative 
hazard identification methods and process of conducting them. The next task is to 
identify different components failure modes that contribute to the occurrence of top 
event. In this step it is required to obtain failure rate data for different component. For 
this research, generic data are gathered from Center for Chemical Process Safety 
reliability data (AIChE 1989) and Offshore Reliability Data Handbook (SINTEF 2002).  
It should be noted that generic data are historical data collected from similar 
industries and have limitation to properly reflect plant specific condition and 
characteristics of the plant equipment/component under consideration. 
  
3.2.1 Scope identification & system description 
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Figure 6. Framework for the dynamic Bayesian network based dynamic operational risk 
assessment method 
 
 
3.2.3 Development of dynamic fault tree 
Fault tree is a widely accepted method in oil/gas, chemical, petrochemical and 
other process plant for quantitative risk assessment. But, fault tree has limited capability 
to incorporate sequential dependencies. Therefore, this research proposes to develop 
dynamic fault tree for the system conceptually to capture sequential dependencies. 
Dynamic fault tree build-up is also a deductive process where top event is first identified 
Scope Identification and System Description 
Develop Dynamic Fault Tree 
Develop Bayesian Network 
Develop Dynamic Bayesian 
Network by Temporal Reasoning 
Probability Estimation for 
Different Time Slice 
Identification of Possible Initiating Event & 
Component Failure Mode 
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and then causes of that top event are detected. Sequential dependencies of different 
causes are identified and they are presented by dynamic gates as described in section 
3.1.2. Events without sequential dependencies are presented by static fault tree gates. 
Detailed developing procedure of dynamic fault tree is described by Dugan et al. (1992).   
 
3.2.4 Develop Bayesian network & dynamic Bayesian network 
 
3.2.4.1 Bayesian network mapping 
The next part is to map the dynamic fault tree into Bayesian network. 
Transforming dynamic fault tree in Bayesian network and eventually in dynamic 
Bayesian network is the important step for developing dynamic operational risk 
assessment with Bayesian network. The dynamic fault tree consists of two types of 
gates, i.e., the conventional fault tree gates and the dynamic gates. The conventional 
fault tree gates, i.e., OR-gate, AND-gate, K/M gates, involve equipment/component 
which does not show sequential dependencies. On the other hand, the dynamic gates i.e.,  
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spare gate, PAND gate, FDEP/PDEP gate and SEQ gate, describe sequential 
dependencies of different equipment/components.  
The static part of the dynamic fault tree is mapped in Bayesian network 
according to the method provided by Bobbio et al. (2001). The mapping algorithm 
consists of both graphical and quantitative transformation. For graphical mapping, all 
basic or primary events of fault tree root/parents nodes are created in the Bayesian 
network. Prior probability is calculated for the component using exponential distribution. 
Then, intermediate nodes and top event nodes are created for intermediate events and top 
event of the fault tree respectively. These event occurrences in Bayesian network are 
conditioned by assigning conditional probability table. In fault tree, the intermediate 
events are related to the basic or primary event through OR-gate and AND-gate. Figure 7 
represents parallel Bayesian network for the OR-gate and AND-gate and their 
corresponding conditional probability table.  Mapping of dynamic gates of dynamic fault 
tree are mainly based on Montani et al. (2005). Detailed description of different dynamic 
gates mapping in dynamic Bayesian network is discussed in section 3.2.4.2.  
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(a.1) AND-gate 
 N= Normal state = 0 
F= Failed state = 1 
A B Output 
0 0 0 
1 0 0 
0 1 0 
1 1 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b.1) OR-gate 
  
 
A B Output 
0 0 0 
1 0 1 
0 1 1 
1 1 1 
 
Figure 7. Mapping algorithm of AND-gate and OR-gate in Bayesian network 
 
 
3.2.4.2 Dynamic Bayesian network development 
The next step of the framework is to develop dynamic Bayesian network (DBN). 
In DBN, the nodes and their causal relationship are presented for various time slices.  
A B 
Output 
A B 
Output 
AND-
Gate 
A B 
Output 
OR-
Gate 
A B 
Output 
(a.2) Bayesian network 
of AND-Gate 
(b.2) Bayesian network 
of OR-Gate 
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The important step in development of dynamic Bayesian network is to map dynamic 
gates of dynamic fault tree in dynamic Bayesian network. The mapping procedure of 
dynamic gates in this study is based on Montani et al. (2005) and is discussed in section 
3.2.4.2.1. Then the network is expanded for different time slices as described in section 
3.2.4.3. 
 
3.2.4.2.1 Mapping spare gate in Bayesian network 
Figure 8 presents spare gates that has a primary component with two stand-by 
component S1 and S2 identical to the primary component. When primary component fails 
then, the first stand-by S1 becomes active. If S1 fails, then S2 becomes active and keeps 
the system operating. When primary and both stand-by S1 and S2 fail, then the warm 
spare gates represent failed state of the system. These root nodes are provided with prior 
probability by using failure rate data in exponential distribution. Then this network is 
expanded for another time slice.  
From figure 8, it is observed that each component node at next time slice is 
similar to that at the previous time slice. To represent the dependency of component state 
at different time-slices, an arc is drawn from primary component node, S1 node and S2 
node of ‘n-th’ time slice to primary component node, S1 node and S2 node of ‘(n+1)-th’ 
time slice. It demonstrates that component states at ‘(n+1)-th’ time slice are dependent 
on their state at previous time slice. According to WSP, generally the primary 
component is in operation and if it fails, then the standby component becomes active. If 
the first standby component fails, then second standby component comes into operation.  
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The dependency is shown by drawing an arc from the primary component of ‘n-th’ slice 
to the stand-by components, S1 and S2 at ‘(n+1)-th’ time slice. Also, as second standby 
component becomes active after first one’s failure, an arc is drawn from S1 of first time-
slice to S2 of next time slice.  Therefore, if the primary component is active at first time 
slice, then its failure rate will be λprimary and at that time standby component can fail with 
failure rate αλS1 and αλS2. If primary component fails at ‘n-th time’ slice, then S1 is active 
and it can fail at ‘(n+1)-th’ time slice with failure rate, λS1 and λS2 still have failure rate 
equal to αλS2. The overall system become non-operational when primary and its entire 
standby component fail.  
Conditional probability table for components states in spare gates at ‘(n+1)-th’ 
time slice given the component state at ‘n-th’ time slice is provided in tables 1, 2 and 3. 
In tables 1 to 6, Δt represents interval between two time slices, i.e., ‘(n+1)-th’ and ‘n-th’ 
time slice. If ‘n-th’ time slice is at 3 months, and the ‘(n+1)-th’ time slice is at 6 months, 
then the time interval between the slices is,  
Δt = (6-3) months = 3 months = 3×30×24 hours = 2160 hours 
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Figure 8. Spare gates of dynamic fault tree mapping in dynamic Bayesian network 
(Montani et al., 2005) 
 
 
Table 1 Conditional probability table for primary component state at ‘(n+1)-th’ time 
slice given its state at ‘n-th’ time slice 
Primary Component 
State at ‘n-th’ Time Slice 
Normal State Failed State 
State at ‘(n+1)-
th’ Time Slice 
Normal State Exp(-λprimary × Δt) 0 
Failed State 1- Exp(-λprimary × Δt) 1 
 
S2 
SP 
Primary 
S1 
S2 
Primary 
 
S1 
At ‘n-th’ time slice At ‘(n+1)-th’ time slice 
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Table 2 Conditional probability table for the first standby component state at ‘(n+1)-th’ 
time slice given the state of primary component and first standby component at ‘n-th’ 
time slice  
 State at ‘n-th’ Time Slice 
Primary Component Normal State Failed State 
First Standby Component Normal State 
Failed 
State 
Normal State 
Failed 
State 
 
State at ‘(n+1)-
th’ Time Slice 
Normal 
State 
Exp(-αλS1Δt) 0 Exp(-λS1Δt) 0 
Failed 
State 
1-Exp(-αλS1Δt) 1 1- Exp(-λS1Δt) 1 
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Table 3 Conditional probability for second standby component state at ‘(n+1)-th’ time 
slice given state of primary component, first standby and second standby components 
state at ‘n-th’ time slice 
 State at ‘n-th’ Time Slice 
Primary Normal Failed 
First Standby Normal Failed Normal Failed 
Second Standby Nor- 
mal 
Fai-
led 
Nor- 
mal 
Fai-
led 
Nor- 
mal 
Fai-
led 
Nor- 
mal 
Fai-
led 
At (n+1)-
th Time 
Slice 
Nor 
mal 
Exp(-
αλS2Δt) 
0 Exp(-
αλS2Δt) 
0 Exp(-
αλS2Δt) 
0 Exp(-
λS2Δt) 
0 
Faile
d 
1-Exp(-
αλS2Δt) 
1 1-Exp(-
αλS2Δt) 
1 1-Exp(-
αλS2Δt) 
1 1-Exp(-
λS2Δt) 
1 
 
 
  
If any system consists of a primary component and ‘n’ number of standby 
components, then the n-th standby component will have 2n states in conditional 
probability table.  
 The conditional probability given in tables 1, 2 and 3 holds true if the primary 
and standby equipment failure in spare gate are basic events. However, if they are 
intermediate events as shown in figure 9, then it is required to incorporate conditional 
dependency of intermediate events on their respective basic events.      
39 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Spare gates of dynamic fault tree with intermediate inputs mapping in 
dynamic Bayesian network  
 
 
If the basic events P1_t (failure rate, λP1_t) and P2_t (failure rate, λP2_t) are in an 
OR-gate with the intermediate event Primary_t ((failure probability, λoverall) ) at n-th time 
slice, then the overall failure rate of Primary_t at n-th time slice is the sum of basic 
events failure rate. If the basic event s P1_t (failure rate, λP1_t) and P2_t (failure rate, 
λP2_t) are in an AND-gate with the intermediate event Primary_t ((failure probability, 
λoverall) ) at n-th time slice, then the overall failure rate of Primary_t at n-th time slice is 
the product of basic events failure rate. The above statements are also true for standby 
equipment. Therefore, the primary event node i.e. Primary_t+1 at (n+1)-th time slice is 
dependent on Primary_t of n-th time slice, P1_t+1 and P2_t+1 of (n+1)-th time slice. 
Similar dependency exists for standby_t+1 node. The conditional probability table for  
At ‘n-th’ time slice At ‘(n+1)-th’ time slice 
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primary and standby node at (n+1)-th time slice are given in tables 4 and 5.  
 
 
Table 4 Conditional probability table for primary component state at ‘(n+1)-th’ time 
slice given its state at ‘n-th’ time slice for spare gate as in figure 9  
Primary_t N F 
P1_t+1 N F N F 
P2_t+1 N F N F N F N F 
Primary_t+1 
N exp(-λoverall× Δt) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F 1- exp(-λoverall× Δt) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
 
 
Table 5 Conditional probability table for standby component state at ‘(n+1)-th’ time 
slice given its state at ‘n-th’ time slice for spare gate as in figure 9  
Primary_t N F 
Standby_t N F N F 
S1_t+1 N F N F N F N F 
S2_t+1 N F N F N F N F N F N F N F N F 
Primar
y_t+1 
N P1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 P2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F 1-P1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1-P2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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The value of P1 and P2 are as follows: 
P1= exp(-λoverall_standby × Δt) 
P2= exp(-α × λoverall_standby × Δt) 
 
3.2.4.2.2 Mapping functional/probabilistic dependency gate in Bayesian network 
In function/probabilistic dependency gate (FDEP/PDEP), the status of the trigger  
event readily determines the states of the dependent event. The mapping procedure of 
FDEP/PDEP is based on work by Montani et al. (2005).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. FDEP/PDEP gate mapping in dynamic Bayesian network (Montani et al., 
2005) 
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In FDEP/PDEP gates, an arc connects the trigger event node at ‘n-th time slice’ 
with that node at the ‘(n+1)-th’ time slice. The dependent components, X and Y, on 
trigger event also have an arc from present to future time slice. Also, the trigger event 
has two arcs connected to the dependent components representing that the status of 
trigger event at a time-slice has impact on the dependent components. Detailed 
conditional probability table for FDEP/PDEP gate is provided in tables 6 and 7.   
 
 
Table 6 Conditional probability table for trigger event at ‘(n+1)-th’ time slice given its 
state at ‘n-th’ time slice 
Trigger Event 
State at ‘n-th’ Time Slice 
Normal State Failed State 
State at ‘(n+1)-th’ Time 
Slice 
Normal State Exp(-λT × Δt) 0 
Failed State 1- Exp(-λT × Δt) 1 
 
 
Here, ‘λT’ represents the failure rate data of the trigger event and Δt gives the 
time interval between (n+1)-th and n-th time slice.  
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Table 7 Conditional probability table for dependent components at ‘(n+1)-th’ time slice 
given the state of trigger event at ‘n-th’ time slice 
 
State Trigger Event and Dependent Component at ‘n-th’ 
Time Slice 
Trigger Event Normal State Failed State 
State of Component at 
‘(n+1)-th’ Time Slice  
Normal State 
Failed 
State 
Normal State 
Failed 
State 
First 
Dependent 
Component, 
X 
Normal 
State 
Exp(-λXΔt) 0 0 0 
Failed 
State 
1-Exp(-λXΔt) 1 1 1 
Second 
Dependent 
Component, 
Y 
Normal 
State 
Exp(-λYΔt) 0 0 0 
Failed 
State 
1-Exp(-λYΔt) 1 1 1 
 
 
 
The structure of conditional probability tables for all dependent components is 
same. Hence, if the system has more dependent components than shown above, they will 
also have a similar conditional probability table.  
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 3.2.4.2.3 Mapping priority AND-gate (PAND Gate) 
 The priority AND-gates require failure of all components in a pre-assigned order. 
Following are the conditional probability tables for the PAND-gate shown in figure 4, in 
which there are two components X and Y respectively and PAND-gate fails if X fails 
before Y fails.  
 
 
Table 8 Conditional probability table for component ‘X’ at ‘(n+1)-th’ time slice given 
its state at ‘n-th’ time slice 
Component ‘X’ 
State at ‘n-th’ Time Slice 
Normal State Failed State 
State at ‘(n+1)-th’ 
Time Slice 
Normal State Exp(-λX × Δt) 0 
Failed State 1- Exp(-λX × Δt) 1 
 
  
 According to Montani et al. (2005) component Y can stay in operating or failed 
state before component X fails or failed after component X state fails. PAND gate will 
result in failure only if component X and component Y both fail and X fails before Y. 
Therefore, the values to put in conditional probability tables for component Y are given 
below: 
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Pr{Y(t+1) = failed before X at (n+1)-th time slice | Y(t) = failed before X at n-th time 
slice} = 1 
Pr{Y(t+1) = failed before X at (n+1)-th time slice | X(t), X(t+1) and Y(t) = working} = 
1- exp (-λB×Δt) 
Pr{Y(t+1) = failed after X at (n+1)-th time slice | Y(t) = failed after X at n-th time slice} 
= 1 
Pr{Y(t+1) = failed after X at (n+1)-th time slice | X(t), X(t+1) and Y(t) = working} =  
1- exp (-λB×Δt) 
Pr{Y(t+1) = failed after X at (n+1)-th time slice | X(t)=failed at n-th time slice, X(t+1) 
and Y(t) = working} = 1- exp (-λB×Δt) 
Therefore, the final status of PAND-gate at (n+1)-th time slice depends will be in fail 
state if X at (n+1)-th time slice fails before Y at (n+1)-th time slice. Else, it will be in 
working state.  
 
3.2.4.3 Dynamic Bayesian network development for different time slices 
 To develop dynamic Bayesian network, the mapped dynamic fault tree according 
to the method described in section 3.2.4.1 is considered as the network for first time 
slice. Then this network from first time-slice is expanded to several time-slices. Network 
of present time slice has causal influence from the network of previous time slice. 
Number of time slices required is decided by the person performing the study.  
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3.2.5 Probability estimation 
Montani et al. (2005) demonstrated procedure for dynamic Bayesian network 
development. Full specification is given below:  
 Prior probabilities of all basic events at the first time slice (for a certain time) 
 Conditional  probability tables should be assigned for all intermediate events for 
the first time slice  
 Provide conditional probability tables for all basic and intermediate events for 
future time slices. Conditional probability table structure is discussed in section 
3.2.4.2 
 
GeNIe software is used to perform the analysis. When the network is developed 
and all nodes are provided either prior or conditional probability, then the software does 
the calculation and provides probability for all nodes. 
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4. APPLICATION OF THE METHODOLOGY 
 
 The application of the methodology is provided with a case study on a tank hold 
up problem. The problem is demonstrated step by step and then how inspection time 
interval can affect the risk is shown. Then possible effect of repair is incorporated in the 
model to describe modeling flexibility of the Bayesian network based model for risk 
analysis.  
 
4.1 Case Study: A Tank Holdup Problem 
 
4.1.1 Scope identification and system description 
A holdup tank problem shown in figure 11 is provided to illustrate the 
methodology. Similar types of holdup tank problem were studied by Aldemir (1987), Siu 
(1992) and Hurdle (2009). Under normal condition, the level of the system is maintained 
between ‘x1’ and ‘x2’. In normal circumstances, liquid flows out through the outlet 
valve, which is partially open. A primary pump supplies liquid to the system. Sensor, S1 
sends signal to controller C1, to actuate valve-, V1 either to open to supply more liquid or 
close to reduce supply of liquid to maintain the level between ‘x1’ and ‘x2’. If the liquid 
level goes above ‘h’, then an overflow scenario may happen. High level sensor, S2 
detects the level and sends signal to high level alarm, LAH. If high level alarm sounds, 
then an operator goes to open manual safety valve so that liquid also flows out through it 
to bring the liquid level in the desired region. When level comes to the operating region, 
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then the operator closes the manual safety valve.  If the liquid level goes below‘d’, then 
a dryout scenario may happen. Sensor S3 is low level sensor and if level goes beyond 
‘d’, then it sends a signal to the controller C3 to actuate valve, V3 to close so that liquid 
cannot go out the system and level can return to the desired operating region. When level 
stables, the outlet valve opens again to the previous condition. In case of primary pump 
failure, a standby pump starts and continues delivery of liquid to the system.  
 
4.1.2 Identification of possible top event and component failure mode 
Two types of scenario can occur in the system i.e., overflow and dry-out. Dry-out 
occurs in the system when the liquid level goes below ‘d’ due to no or less flow to the 
system, protection system fails and the outlet valve, V3 fails. If there is any leakage in 
the pipe or if the pump system fails, then there can be no or less flow to the system. 
Pump system failure can occur in two ways, i.e. either both pumps fails or flow control 
system associated with the pumps fails.  
In normal condition, the primary pump is supposed to deliver liquid to the 
system. So, if the primary pump is stopped spuriously then the standby pump has to start 
immediately to continue liquid supply to the system. If the standby pump fails to start on 
demand then there will be no flow from the pump to the system. Flow control system to 
the pump consists of a controller, level sensor and the control valve. Sensor can also 
have spurious operation and fail to send signal to the controller. Also, the controller can 
fail to actuate the valve or the valve can have mechanical failure. Equipment and 
components failure modes that lead to the dry-out, scenario in the system are listed in   
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table 9. Their failure rates are also provided in table 9. These data are generic data 
obtained from OREDA (OREDA 2002) and CCPS (AIChE 1989).   
 
4.1.3 Develop dynamic fault tree 
The next step in the framework is to develop a dynamic fault tree for the system. 
As the system has a primary pump system which can be substituted by a standby pump, 
the system experiences operational change while standby pump becomes active in case 
primary pump fails. Figure 12 represents developed dynamic fault tree for the tank 
holdup problem. It is discussed in the methodology that dynamic fault tree consists of 
both dynamic and static gates. The developed dynamic fault tree has one type of 
dynamic gate i.e., spare gate and two static gates, i.e., OR-gate and AND-gate.The top 
event of the tree is dry-out in the system. Dry-out can occur if protection system fails or 
less or no flow or outlet valve, V3 fails open. The low level sensor S3 and the controller 
C3 are part of automatic protection system against dry-out. Failure of anyone can result 
in the protection system’s failure. The system can experience no or less flow if there is 
any leakage in pipe or pump system fails. Pump system is the output of a spare gate that 
can be in failed state if the primary pumping system fail stop and the standby pump 
system fails to start of demand. Therefore, primary pumping system and the standby 
pumping system are input to the spare gate. Both the pumping systems consist of a 
pump, a level sensor S1, a controller (C1 for primary pump and C2 for standby pump) 
and a pump discharge valve.  
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Figure 11. A holdup tank (level control system) problem 
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 Table 9 Component failure mode and failure rate data  
Component Failure Mode 
Failure Rate 
(per Hour) 
Data Source 
Primary pump Spurious stop 5.69×10-6 OREDA 
Standby Pump Fail to start on demand 2.52×10-6 OREDA 
Controller, C1 
Pneumatic controller 
failure 
4.34×10-5 CCPS 
Primary Pump 
Outlet Valve, V1 
Failed to regulate 5.5×10-7 OREDA 
Sensor, S1 
Failed to function on 
demand 
1.72×10-6 OREDA 
Controller, C2 
Pneumatic controller 
failure 
4.34×10-5 CCPS 
Standby Pump 
Outlet Valve, V1 
Failed to open on demand 2.81×10-6 OREDA 
Sensor, S3 Spurious operation 1.72×10
-6 OREDA 
Controller, C3 
Pneumatic controller 
failure 
4.34×10-5 CCPS 
Pipe Leakage 
Leakage Lined pipe 
straight section 
0.442×10-6 CCPS 
Outlet Valve, V3 Fails open 2.31×10-6 OREDA 
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Figure 12. Dynamic fault tree for the holdup tank problem 
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4.1.4 Develop Bayesian network 
Bayesian network development is an important step of this study. Step by step 
procedure is as follows to demonstrate the procedure of Bayesian network development.  
 For each basic, intermediate and top event, root, intermediate and top event node are 
created respectively. They are shown in figure 13. 
 Intermediate nodes are connected by arcs from those root nodes that cause the 
intermediate events from the basic events. Then top event node is connected by arcs 
from intermediate nodes and from one root node, as it directly affects the final top 
event. It is shown in figure 14. 
 
4.1.5 Develop dynamic Bayesian network  
The developed Bayesian network represents the causal structure for a single time 
slice. Also, the sequential dependency of the primary pump and the standby pump 
cannot be demonstrated graphically in a single time slice, though the dependency can be 
captured in a conditional probability table. Dynamic Bayesian network can graphically 
represent that dependency. Also, the objective of the methodology is to provide a 
technique that can update the probability of different equipment/components failure with 
time. To make a dynamic network, the network has to be expanded over different time 
slices. For this case study, the dynamic Bayesian network is developed for 6 time slices: 
the first network representing 1 week, the next 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, 12 months 
and 24 months. To illustrate how a dynamic Bayesian network is developed, here only 
construction of two time slices is described to prevent complexity.  
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Figure 13. Root nodes, intermediate nodes and top event nodes in Bayesian network 
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Figure 14. Nodes connected through arcs 
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 A similar new network, developed in section 4.1.4, is developed. The first network is 
presented for first time slice and the new network is presented for second time slice. 
This is shown in figure 15. 
 Procedure of mapping a spare gate in Bayesian network is described in section 
3.2.4.2.1. From primary pump system node of first time slice two arcs connects 
primary pump system node and stand-by pump system node of second time slice. 
Then an arc is drawn from standby pump system node of first time slice to that of the 
next time slice to complete the mapping of spare gate. Mapped spare gate in 
Bayesian network is provided in figure 16. 
 Then, all root nodes of second time slice are connected with the nodes from first time 
slice to represent the conditional dependency of second time slice nodes on that of 
the first time slice. The complete dynamic Bayesian network is shown in figure 17.    
 
4.1.5 Probability estimation 
To estimate probability, the root nodes at first time slice are provided the prior 
probability calculated for a definite time. The prior probabilities of root nodes calculated 
for 1 week are given in table 10. Then, conditional probability tables for all intermediate 
and the complete dynamic Bayesian network is developed for six different inspection 
time intervals. They are 1 week, 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, 1 year and 2 years. For 
standby item, the dormancy factor, α = 0.5, is considered. It is observed that with the 
increase in inspection interval, the probability of top event, dryout of the system, 
increases with time.  It is shown in figure 18. top event nodes of first time slice are 
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provided following the methodology as described in section 3.2.4.2. The nodes in the 
second time slice are also given conditional probability values as described in the same 
section. Then the probabilities for all nodes are calculated in GeNIe software.   
From table 11 it is apparent that all equipment/components failure probability 
increase with the inspection time interval increase. Figure 18 represents the dry-out 
probability upon less or no flow, automatic protection system failure and outlet valve 
fails open, using different inspection interval. Dry-out probability increases with 
increase of inspection intervals due to occurrence of less or no flow probability, 
automatic protection system failure probability and outlet valve fails open probability.  
 In figure 19 it is observed that the failure, less or no flow occurrence, automatic 
protection system failure and outlet valve, V3, fails open probability increases with 
inspection interval increases. Less or no flow and automatic protection system failure are 
much more critical than the outlet valve fails open for dry-out scenario in the system. As 
less or no flow can occur due to pump system failure and pipe leakage, hence, their 
individual probability for different inspection intervals are plotted in figure 20.  From 
figure 20, it is apparent that pipe leakage probability is very low. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the pump system failure is mainly responsible for less or no flow and 
leakage in pipe has negligible effect on that.  
 
  
 
 
 
    
 
58 
 
Figure 15. Dynamic Bayesian network with two time-slices without connection among nodes of two time-slices 
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Figure 16. Mapped spare gate in dynamic Bayesian network 
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Figure 17. Dynamic Bayesian network with two time-slices 
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Table 10 Prior probabilities of root nodes of first time slice at 1 Week  
Component 
Failure Rate 
(per Hour) 
Prior Probability at 1 
Week 
Primary pump 5.69×10-6 1×10-3 
Standby Pump 2.52×10-6 4×10-4 
Controller, C1 4.34×10
-5 7×10-3 
Primary Pump Outlet Valve, V1 5.5×10
-7 9×10-5 
Sensor, S1 1.72×10
-6 3×10-4 
Controller, C2 4.34×10
-5 7×10-3 
Standby Pump Outlet Valve, V1 2.81×10
-6 5×10-4 
Sensor, S3 1.72×10
-6 3×10-4 
Controller, C3 4.34×10
-5 7×10-3 
Pipe Leakage 0.442×10-6 7×10-5 
Outlet Valve, V3 2.31×10-6 4×10-4 
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Table 11 Probability of system dry-out for different equipment/component failure using 
different inspection internals 
Component Weekly Monthly 3 
Months 
6 
Months 
1 
Year 
2 Year 
Primary pump 1×10-3 4×10-3 0.012 0.024 0.048 0.094 
Standby Pump 4×10-4 0.002 0.005 0.011 0.022 0.043 
Controller, C1 7×10
-3 0.031 0.089 0.171 0.313 0.53 
Primary Pump Outlet 
Valve, V1 
9×10-5 3.9×10-4 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.01 
Sensor, S1 3×10
-4 0.001 0.004 0.007 0.015 0.029 
Controller, C2 7×10
-3 0.031 0.089 0.171 0.313 0.53 
Standby Pump Outlet 
Valve, V1 
5×10-4 0.002 0.006 0.012 0.024 0.048 
Sensor, S3 3×10
-4 0.001 0.004 0.007 0.015 0.029 
Controller, C3 7×10
-3 0.031 0.089 0.171 0.313 0.53 
Pipe Leakage 7×10-5 3.1×10-4 0.00095 0.002 0.004 0.008 
Outlet Valve, V3 4×10-4 0.002 0.005 0.01 0.02 0.039 
Primary Pump System 0.008 0.063 0.192 0.353 0.585 0.831 
Standby Pump System 0.008 0.049 0.149 0.284 0.502 0.772 
Pump System 4×10-4 0.004 0.033 0.11 0.307 0.65 
Automatic Protection 
System 
0.007 0.032 0.093 0.177 0.323 0.544 
Less or No Flow 4×10-4 0.005 0.034 0.111 0.31 0.652 
Dry-out 0 0 1.6×10-5 0.0002 0.002 0.014 
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Figure 18. Dry-out probability upon different equipment/components failure using 
different inspection intervals: weekly, monthly, 3 months, 6 months, 1 year and every 2 
year 
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Figure 19. Less or no flow occurrence, automatic protection system failure and outlet 
valve fails open (failure) probability using different inspection intervals: weekly, 
monthly, 3 months, 6 months, 1 year and every 2 year 
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Figure 20. Pump system failure and pipe leakage probability using different inspection 
intervals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
Weekly Monthly 3 Months 6 Months 1 Year 2 Year 
Pump System Failure Pipe Leakage 
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
66 
 
    
 
 
Figure 21. Primary pump and its system components failure probability using different 
inspection intervals 
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Figure 22. Standby Pump and its system components failure probability using different 
inspection intervals 
 
 
In figure 21 and 22, the primary pump and its system components, standby pump 
and its system components failure probability using different inspection intervals are 
presented. Controller failure is more critical than other equipment/components failures in 
the system as its failure probability is much higher than others.   
 In this case study, a tank hold up problem is studied to demonstrate the effect of 
sequential dependency of one equipment/component on another equipment/component 
contributes to the risk.   
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4.2 Application of the Model 
Bobbio et al. (2001) demonstrated Bayesian network’s advantage in probability 
updating in presence of new information over other method. Khakzad et al. (2011) 
described other modeling prospects of Bayesian network such as incorporating multi-
state variables, uncertainty handling. Bobbio et al. (2005) discussed potential of 
integrating effect of repair on the overall system. In this study, analysis is done to 
examine the effects of maintenance/repair in the system. Following maintenance 
schedule analysis is performed to demonstrate how the developed tool can be useful to 
provide optimum maintenance schedule:  
 Every 3 months ( 3 months, 6 months, 9 months, 1 year) 
 Every 6 months (6 months and 1 year) 
For simplicity, it is assumed that maintenance work performed at any time slice 
will restore equipment/components conditional failure probability to the initial state i.e., 
failure probability will be equal to the failure probability of first time slice.   
To demonstrate maintenance effect on the overall system, a node, named quality 
maintenance, is created in the Bayesian network. It is a deterministic node with two 
states, i.e., maintenance work performed or not performed. Quality maintenance has arc 
on the nodes of primary and stand-by pump system and automatic protection system. It 
refers that if maintenance work is performed that these nodes are conditionally 
dependent on the quality maintenance node. All the nodes in all time slices are provided 
their respective conditional probability. Figure 23 presents two-time slice Bayesian 
network of the tank holdup problem with quality maintenance node.   
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Figure 23. Dynamic Bayesian network when maintenance/repair is performed at every 3 months interval (3 months, 6 months 
etc.) 
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Table 12 Probability of system dry-out for different equipment/components failure if   
maintenance/repair takes place at every 3 months 
Maintenance Schedule 3 Months 6 Months 9 Months 1 Year 
Maintenance/Repair Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Primary pump 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.012 
Standby Pump 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 
Controller, C1 0.082 0.009 0.009 0.009 
Primary Pump Outlet Valve, V1 0.001 0.00099 0.00099 0.00099 
Sensor, S1 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Controller, C2 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082 
Standby Pump Outlet Valve, V1 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
Sensor, S3 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Controller, C3 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082 
Pipe Leakage 0.00097 0.002 0.003 0.005 
Outlet Valve, V3 0.005 0.01 0.015 0.02 
Primary Pump System Failure 0.13 0.213 0.314 0.465 
Standby Pump System Failure 0.116 0.239 0.361 0.502 
Pump System Failure 0.018 0.058 0.125 0.25 
Automatic Protection System 
Failure 
0.085 0.086 0.086 0.086 
Less or No Flow 0.019 0.06 0.128 0.254 
Dry-out 8.09×10-6 5.16×10-5 0.00016 0.00043 
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Table 13 Probability of system dry-out for different equipment/components failure if   
maintenance/repair takes place at every 6 months  
Maintenance Schedule 3 Months 6 Months 9 Months 1 Year 
Maintenance/Repair No Yes No Yes 
Primary pump 0.012 0.012 0.024 0.012 
Standby Pump 0.005 0.006 0.012 0.006 
Controller, C1 0.089 0.009 0.018 0.009 
Primary Pump Outlet Valve, V1 0.001 0.00099 0.002 0.00099 
Sensor, S1 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.004 
Controller, C2 0.089 0.082 0.163 0.076 
Standby Pump Outlet Valve, V1 0.006 0.006 0.012 0.006 
Sensor, S3 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.004 
Controller, C3 0.089 0.082 0.163 0.076 
Pipe Leakage 0.00097 0.002 0.003 0.005 
Outlet Valve, V3 0.005 0.01 0.015 0.02 
Primary Pump System Failure 0.13 0.213 0.314 0.0465 
Standby Pump System Failure 0.116 0.239 0.361 0.502 
Pump System Failure 0.018 0.058 0.125 0.25 
Automatic Protection System 
Failure 
0.093 0.085 0.17 0.079 
Less or No Flow 0.019 0.06 0.128 0.254 
Dry-out 8.79×10-6 5.13×10-5 0.00032 0.0004 
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Figure 24. Dryout probability in the system with no maintenance, maintenance work in 
every 3 months and in every 6 months 
 
 
 
Figure 25. Less or no flow probability in the system with no maintenance, maintenance 
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Figure 26. Automatic protection system failure probability in the system with no 
maintenance, maintenance in every 3 months and in every 6 months 
 
 
 
Figure 27. Pump system failure probability in the system with no maintenance, 
maintenance work in every 3 months and in every 6 months 
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In tables 12 and 13, the posterior probability obtained considering quality 
maintenance at every 3 months and 6 months are listed. Then the probabilities of dry-out 
in the system and major intermediate events, as automatic protection system failure, less 
or no flow probability, pump system failure probabilities after maintenance work at 
either 3 months or 6 months are plotted with the probability of equipment/component 
failure with no maintenance work in figure 24, 25, 26 and 27. From the figures, it is 
apparent that maintenance work can significantly reduce failure probability. Though, for 
this case study, maintenance work in every 3 months or 6 months does not provide 
significant differences. If cost of inspection, loss due to equipment downtime, parts 
replacement cost is available, then cost-benefit analysis should be done for optimum 
maintenance scheduling.  
 In this section, the application of developed method is demonstrated by case 
study on a tank hold up problem. Potential application of developed method and 
advantages are also described. It can be concluded that the developed method has the 
ability to quantify time-dependent effects on the process and provide updated probability 
with time.   
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5. GENERALIZING EVENT TREE IN BAYESIAN NETWORK 
 
5.1 Introduction 
An event tree graphically describes possible consequence scenarios if a critical 
event occurs and different safety barriers either function or not. It is an inductive 
approach that starts with an initiating event and it describes the sequences of different 
safeguards and human response. Application of event tree is very helpful to understand 
the logical relationship between the top event and safety barriers success or failure 
states. However, the event tree has limitation to explicitly represent all the factors that 
influence its construction and also to quantify the risk of dynamic system. Bayesian 
network has the ability to incorporate factors influencing event tree structure. In 
Bayesian network, the relationship of different events is described by the conditional 
probability table and clearly shows how an event is dependent on an earlier event. Also, 
any event tree mapped in Bayesian network can be expanded to include factors 
influencing all events occurrence. Thus precise estimation of risk can be obtained.  
This chapter at firstly demonstrates a methodology of event tree of a chemical 
process systems mapping in Bayesian network based on Bearfield and Marsh (2005). 
Then it provides a graphical structure that shows different influencing factors of event 
occurrence.   
 
5.2 Event Tree Mapping into Bayesian Network and Generalization Technique 
 Bearfield and Marsh (2005) described methodology of mapping event tree of  
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train derailment accident into Bayesian network and then provided some generalization 
procedure. Khakzad et al. (2012) adopted the procedure for demonstrating bow-tie 
analysis in Bayesian network. In section 5.2.1.1, general mapping procedure is 
demonstrated, followed by a case study in section 5.2.1.3 and then in section 5.2.1.4 
exploiting Bayesian network modeling’s capability to simplify procedure of mapping 
event tree is described. A case study on reactor system illustrates this procedure.   
 
5.2.1 Mapping 
The following procedure of mapping and generalizing event tree in Bayesian 
network is based on Bearfield and Marsh (2005): 
 Create individual nodes for initiating event and all safety functions/barriers, 
i.e., if there is an initiating event and ‘n’ numbers of safety functions/barriers 
available to respond to that initiating event, then create ‘n+1’ nodes 
representing the initiating event and all safety barriers/functions 
 All developed event nodes can have two states, i.e., failure and success.  
 Create either a single consequence nodes and define ‘p’ number of states for 
different consequences or create ‘p’ numbers of individual consequence 
nodes with two states i.e., occur or not occur 
 Connect arcs from one node to another depending on the events sequences 
and logical consequences 
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Figure 28. A general event tree 
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 All dependent nodes are provided with conditional dependency table  
 Setting up conditional probability is illustrated with an example of event tree 
given in figure 28 and the relative its mapped Bayesian network is shown in 
figure 29. Tables 14, 15, 16 presents conditional probability tables for 
different events. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29. A general event tree mapped in Bayesian network 
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Table 14 Conditional probability table for Event node ‘A’ 
Failure Probability X1 
Success Probability 1-X1 
 
 
Table 15  Conditional probability table for event node ‘B’ depending on state of event 
node ‘A’ 
Event A Failure Success 
Event B 
Failure X2 X3 
Success 1- X2 1-X3 
 
 
Table 16 Conditional probability table for event node ‘C’ depending on state of event 
node ‘A’ and event node ‘B’  
Event A Failure Success 
Event B Failure Success Failure Success 
Event C 
X4 X5 X6 X7 
1- X4 1- X5 1- X6 1- X7 
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Table 17 Deterministic probability table for consequence node 
Event A Failure (F) Success (S) 
Event B Failure (F) Success (S) Failure (F) Success (S) 
Event C F S F S F S F S 
X 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Y 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
Z 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
 
If all the consequences are presented in a single consequence node, then the 
conditional probability for different consequences is assigned as table 17. If the 
consequences are presented in different nodes, then conditional probability table for each 
consequence node has to be assigned separately.   
 
5.2.2 Generalization 
 An arc from an event node to the consequence node can be removed if the 
logical formulae refers that the event has no effect on the consequence 
 An arc from one event node to another event node can be removed if that 
event’s failure or success probability does not depends on the  previous event 
node, i.e., the failure or success has the same probability of occurrence 
irrespective of the previous event state.  
     
  
81 
5.3 Case Study   
Crowl and Louvar (2002) described a reactor system as shown in figure 30. In 
this reactor system, the temperature of reactor increases due to cooling system failure 
can lead to a runway reaction with pressure above the reactor bursting pressure. The 
cooling system is employed to remove excess energy of reaction. There is a 
thermocouple to measure the temperature inside the reactor and a temperature controller 
to actuate a control valve to maintain cooling water flow rate. In case of automatic 
protection system failure, a high temperature alarm is provided to alert the operator. Four 
safety functions are available. The first safety function is high temperature alarm to alert 
operator and the rest three functions depend on operator actions such as operator 
noticing high temperature, restart cooling and manual shut down of the reactor. Figure 
31 is the event tree for the reactor system provided in figure 30. The success of failures 
of the safety barriers can lead to following three consequences: 
 
A: Continue operation 
B: Safe shutdown  
C: Runway reaction 
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Figure 30. A chemical reactor system (Crowl and Louvar, 2002) 
 
 
The description of the event tree is as follows:   
 Initiating event for the event tree in figure 31 is loss of cooling which can be 
observed as an increase of temperature. In figure 32, a node named ‘T 
increase’ is created to represent the initiating event 
 High temperature alarm alerts operator if alarm functions properly in case of  
temperature increases. Also, if alarm fails, then operator can either notice 
temperature increase by observing other indicators in the process or fails to 
notice it 
 If operator notices temperature increase, then he starts restarting cooling. If 
restart of cooling succeeds, then system operation will continue. If it fails, 
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then the operator has to shutdown the operation to prevent runaway reaction. 
But, if operator fails to shut-down properly, then a run-away reaction results.  
 
 
 
Figure 31. An event tree of a chemical reactor system 
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Figure 32. Mapped event tree in Bayesian network  
  
 
In figure 32, the event tree is mapped into Bayesian network. Mapping procedure 
is as follows:  
 For initiating event, temperature increase, a node is created and named ‘T 
increase’ 
 For four safety functions, four event nodes are created and three consequences 
nodes are created for three consequence states 
 Initiating event node has direct influence on the alarm and operator notices node. 
Therefore, two arcs from that node connects ‘alarm’ and ‘operator-notices’ node 
 All safety function nodes are connected among each other through arcs 
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 As different consequences results from the initiating event and subsequent safety 
barriers failure, arcs are connected from initiating event node and safety function 
nodes to each consequence nodes  
 Consequences nodes are also connected among themselves to represent their 
sequences 
Conditional probability table for each event is provided in following tables 18, 19, 20 
and 21.  
 
 
Table 18 Prior probability of initiating event (temperature increase)  
Event Not Occurred (No) 0 
Event Occurred (Yes) 1 
 
 
 
Table 19 Conditional probability table for alarm node given initiating event 
(temperature increases) node states  
Temperature increase No Yes 
Alarm 
Not sound 1 0.01 
Sounds 0 0.99 
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Table 20 Conditional probability table for event node ‘Operator_notices’ given states of 
initiating event and alarm node  
Temperature 
Increase 
No Yes 
Alarm Not Sound Sounds Not Sound Sounds 
Operator 
Notices 
Yes 0 0 0.75 0 
No 1 1 0.25 1 
 
 
 
Table 21 Conditional probability table for ‘operator re-starts cooling’ node given state 
of ‘operator_notices’ nodes  
Operator Notice Yes No 
Re-start 
Cooling 
Yes 0.75 0.75 
No 0.25 0.25 
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Table 22 Conditional probability table for ‘operator shutdowns reactor’ given states of 
‘operator notices temperature increase’ and ‘operator re-starts cooling’  
Operator notices No Yes 
Operator re-starts cooling Yes No Yes No 
Operator 
shutdowns 
reactor 
Yes 0 0.90 0 1 
No 1 0.10 1 0 
 
 
 
Table 23, 24 and 25 presents conditional probability tables for the consequence nodes.   
 
 
Table 23 Conditional probability table for ‘continue operation’ consequence node  
Temperature increases No Yes 
Operator re-starts cooling Yes No Yes No 
Continue 
Operation 
Not_continue 0 0 0 1 
Continued 1 1 1 0 
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Table 24 Conditional probability table for ‘Safe shutdown’ consequence node  
Shutdown Yes No 
Safe 
Shutdown 
Succeeds 1 0 
No-shutdown 0 1 
 
 
 
Table 25 Conditional probability table for ‘Runaway reaction’ consequence node  
Continue 
Operation 
Not_continue Continues 
Operator 
notices 
temperature 
increasing 
Yes No Yes No 
Safe 
Shutdo
wn 
 
Succee
ds 
No-
Shutdo
wn 
Suc
cee
ds 
No-
Shutdo
wn 
Succee
ds 
No-
Shutdo
wn 
Succee
ds 
No-
Shutdo
wn 
Yes 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
No 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
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Calculated final probabilities of the consequences are: 
A. continues operation probability is 0.748 
B. Safe shutdown probability is 0.224 
C. Runaway reaction probability in 0.027 
 
In this section, an event tree mapping in Bayesian network is discussed. Bayesian 
network can easily propagate the conditional dependency of one event occurrence on  
 
 
 
Figure 33. Bayesian network with ‘alarm’ node evidence value set to 1 
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another event and represent sequence of safety function/barriers failure results a 
particular consequence. For example, in Bayesian network, evidence can be set at any 
node and posterior probability and event propagation can be easily obtained. For 
example, in the Bayesian network shown in figure 33, the evidence of ‘alarm’ node is set 
up 1 which means that the alarm fails to alert the operator.  In table 26, the prior and 
posterior probability of different safety function/barriers failure after the observation 
 
 
Table 26 Prior and posterior probability table for all event and consequences  
Event and Consequences Prior 
Probability 
Posterior Probability 
Probability (Each event/consequence 
occurrence | alarm fails to alert operator) 
Temperature increase 1 1 
Alarm 0.01 1 
Operator notices 0.25 0.25 
Operator re-starts cooling 0.25 0.438 
Operator shut-down process 0.224 0.831 
Operation continues 0.75 0.57 
Safe shutdown 0.224 0.17 
Runaway reaction 0.027 0.26 
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that alarm fails alert the operator are provided. From table 26, it can be concluded that if 
alarm fails to alert the operator, then the probability of operator failure to re-start cooling 
and shut-down process increases largely. Therefore, the consequences probability also 
changes. The probability of operation continues decreases from 0.75 to 0.57 and safety 
shutdown probability also decreases from 0.224 to 0.17 while the chances of a runaway 
reaction increase largely from 0.027 to 0.26. Thus setting different evidence in every 
node, the effect on other nodes can be easily obtained in Bayesian network.   
Then, Bayesian network modeling is very flexible. The factors influencing each 
safety functions/barriers failure can be incorporated in Bayesian network using its 
modeling flexibility. For example, for above discusses case study, the initiating event is 
the increase in temperature due to loss of cooling. Different factors can cause loss of 
cooling i.e., cooling water supply system may fail, and pipeline may have blockage or 
leaks. The factors such as fatigue, job stress may cause operator failure to perform 
different actions. Conventional event tree has limitation to represent these factors which 
can be easily represented in Bayesian network. Thus, Bayesian network application 
provides advantages over event tree.  
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6. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Bayesian network is relatively new technique in the field of process safety and 
risk analysis. Application of Bayesian network in risk analysis is very advantageous as it 
can combine the expert judgment and quantitative knowledge to estimate risk. Also, 
Bayesian network demonstrates changes of variables with time through reasoning 
process. Bayesian network is very much helpful for the area where availability of data is 
limited.  
 This study demonstrates discrete time dynamic Bayesian network for dynamic 
operational risk assessment. This methodology has the ability to provide updated 
probability with time, to incorporate inspection and testing time interval, which shows 
its effect on the critical event probability. As this technique is based on Bayesian 
network, it has the advantages of flexibility in modeling. This technique is very efficient 
to estimate risk in comparison to other techniques with respect to time and efforts. A 
case study on tank holdup problem demonstrates its application. In the next part, event 
tree is mapped and generalized using Bayesian network so that different factors 
influencing event tree construction can be incorporated. Case studies are provided to 
demonstrate the method.  
 This method provides methodology of dynamic operational risk assessment on 
discrete-time Bayesian network. Therefore, future work is intended to develop 
methodology of dynamic operational risk assessment on continuous time Bayesian 
network. For continuous time Bayesian network, probability distribution is required. 
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Thus using the concept of Bayesian statistics, the probability distribution obtained from 
generic data bases can be combined with plant specific data to obtain posterior 
information. Boudali and Dugan (2006) and Nodelman et al. (2002, 2003 and 2005) will 
be good starting points for this work.  
 In this study, brief application of dynamic Bayesian network is demonstrated for 
optimum risk based maintenance scheduling. Weber et al (2012) described different 
researches in this field in brief, which can be used for further reference. Celeux et al. 
(2006) described designing preventive maintenance using Bayesian network and Jones et 
al. (2010) demonstrated an application of Bayesian network for manufacturing industry’s 
maintenance planning. There are scopes for detailed analysis for maintenance scheduling 
by incorporating different maintenance concepts such as “as good as new” and “as bad 
as old”, different factors such as maintenance actions for chemical process industries. 
Also cost-benefit analysis can be performed within GeNIe software if cost of inspection, 
downtime, repair etc. is available.  
Another dynamic aspect of process plant is equipment/components ageing 
phenomenon. In this research, the failure rate values are considered constant with time, 
but in practical life, due to ageing the failure rate tends to increase with time. Therefore, 
it is suggested to develop models in Bayesian network with the capability of quantifying 
ageing. It should be noted that when ageing is considered, then Weibull distribution is to 
be used in lieu of exponential distribution as the later one has memory-less property. 
 One of the objectives of this study is to demonstrate different risk assessment 
techniques parallelism with Bayesian network. In this study, mainly focus is given on 
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quantitative risk assessment techniques and their mapping in Bayesian network. For 
future work, it is recommended to map qualitative technique such as HAZOP, FMEA in 
Bayesian network and to develop risk ranking matrix based on the results. Therefore, 
Bayesian network may provide a unifying platform for risk analysis.   
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